Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence by Dubois, Pierre et al.
Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs:
Theory and Empirical Evidence
Pierre Dubois, Bruno Jullieny, Thierry Magnacz
First version: February 2004
This version: December 2007
Abstract
We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions in which commitment is
limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption
growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure each other
through both formal contracts and informal agreements, that is, self-enforcing agreements
specifying voluntary transfers. This theoretical setting nests the case of complete markets
and the case where only informal agreements are available. We derive a system of non-
linear equations for income and consumption growth. A key prediction of our model is
that both variables are a¤ected by lagged consumption as a consequence of the interplay
of formal and informal contracting possibilities. In a semi-parametric setting, we prove
identication, derive testable restrictions and estimate the model with the use of data from
Pakistan villages. Empirical results are consistent with the economic arguments. Incentive
constraints due to self-enforcement bind with positive probability and formal contracts are
used to reduce this probability.
JEL Classication: C14, D13, D91, L14, O12
Key Words: Risk sharing, Contracts, Incomplete Markets, Informal Transfers
Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ & IDEI & INRA), (dubois@toulouse.inra.fr).
yToulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ & IDEI), (bjullien@cict.fr).
zToulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ & IDEI), (magnac@cict.fr).
1
1 Introduction1
Limited commitment is an attractive way of accommodating consistent empirical evidence that
full-risk sharing is rejected in village economies. In this paper, we nest complete markets and
limited commitment in a unied set-up. In the context of risk sharing, we show the empiri-
cal relevance of the joint consideration of incomplete markets and dynamic interactions using
household data from villages in Pakistan.
Limited commitment refers to situations in which there is no legal contract enforceability
(Thomas and Worrall, 1988). Some level of insurance can nonetheless be achieved through in-
formal agreements between agents engaged in a long-term relationship. These agreements take
the form of voluntary transfers that are self-enforcing in a game theoretic sense. Parties abide
by the informal agreement because they anticipate that defection would result in the break-
down of future protable informal agreements. The existing literature has contrasted setttings
with a complete market structure and settings in which all agreements are informal. Yet, real
institutions, and in particular village institutions, usually involve a mix of formal and informal
agreements. Indeed, village institutions may be able to enforce specic types of formal contracts
like sharecropping or other land-leasing contracts even if a complete market structure is beyond
reach.
In this paper we propose a model of risk sharing that allows for two types of transactions
between agents voluntary transfers and formal contracts. A distinguishing feature is the focus
on the interaction between contracts and informal agreements. Informal agreements can, not only
specify voluntary transfers in various states of nature but also which contracts should be signed
and when. As a consequence, all observed decisions in equilibrium are part of informal agreements
including formal contracts. Formal contracting, instead of expanding the set of feasible transfers,
serves to expand the set of incentive compatible allocations by allowing parties to use them as an
enforcement tool for voluntary transfers. To some extent, formal contracts are used as collateral
in informal lending-borrowing agreements in a risk sharing context. Individuals receiving a large
transfer because of negative income shocks, for instance should, in exchange, concede more
favorable terms on the formal contracts, raising the future prospects of the other party. The
existence of formal contracting relaxes incentive constraints due to limited commitment and
improves global e¢ ciency.
1We thank IFPRI for providing us with the data. We are indebted to Fabien Postel-Vinay for very detailed
comments. We thank the co-editor and three referees for their comments, Orazio Attanasio, Richard Blundell,
Andrew Foster, Patrick Gonzalez, Stéphane Grégoir, Ethan Ligon, Thomas Mariotti, Mark Rosenzweig, Bernard
Salanié, Mike Whinston and Tim Worall for discussions, and participants at seminars at Toulouse, CREST,
Bristol, Southampton, University College of London, Montréal, Laval University, Cergy, Namur, CEMFI, IZA,
Mannheim, Alicante, Munich and Yale and conferences (Jean Jacques La¤ont05, WCES05 London, SBE05
Natal, ASSET06, Lisbon) for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Another key contribution of this paper is the econometric and empirical implementation using
data from village economies in Pakistan which shows that our theoretical model is an empirically
credible alternative. We do more than simply test the alternatives of complete markets, limited
commitment and the mix of formal and informal contracts. We exhibit the conditions under
which the model is semi-parametrically identied, derive its testable implications and test them.
Contract enforcement depends on specic institutions within each village and evaluating their
degree of formality is a di¢ cult task. This motivates us to work within the set-up of Deaton
(1997) in that we do not examine specic institutions in villages but the consequences they have
on household behavior in terms of the dynamics of income and consumption. To this end, we
exploit the rich dynamics that our setting generates. We characterize the dynamics of household
consumption and income by showing that these processes are functions of a state variable which
is the relative marginal utility of consumption of the household with respect to the village.
The process of this state variable retains a rich memory of the past in contrast to the limited
commitment case in which once an incentive compatibility constraint is binding, all the past
becomes irrelevant. Household relative marginal utility is a random walk with jumps (as in the
limited commitment case of Ligon, Thomas and Worrall, 2002) although the occurrence and size
of jumps are not exogenous and depend on the relative marginal utility in the previous period.
Our paper builds upon a rich empirical and theoretical literature on village economies in
LDCs. Starting with the seminal paper of Townsend (1994), the empirical evaluation of the
complete market hypothesis in village economies has led to a better understanding of market
failures and to a better identication of the characteristics of the households that are most a¤ected
by these failures (Deaton, 1997, Morduch, 1999, Fafchamps, 2003, Dercon, 2004). In developed
countries, the question of interest is also how well agents are insured (Attanasio and Rios-Rull,
2003, Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston, 2003). Regarding theoretical arguments, we specically
use the literature that highlights the issue of contract enforcement and limited commitment in
risk sharing (see Thomas and Worrall, 1988, Kocherlakota, 1996). Indeed, village economies lack
the institutions needed to enforce contracts and in most villages, there are no written records
of transfers such as loans, nor are there proper institutions designed to enforce repayments,
which can therefore be delayed or simply canceled. As a consequence, villagers use informal
agreements that are Pareto-improving provided they can be self-enforced (Coate and Ravallion,
1993, Fafchamps, 1992). This requirement restricts the set of informal agreements which in turn
may not be rich enough to achieve complete risk sharing in the village. A few recent papers
show that these arguments are empirically relevant and that self-enforcing transfers play a part
in sharing risk within villages (Ligon, Thomas and Worrall, 2000, 2002) and within networks or
extended families (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001).
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Full risk sharing and limited commitment are two polar cases, however. Some institutions
might help enforce some formal contracts. Specically, sharecropping and xed rent formal con-
tracts are commonly observed in villages of LDCs and their role in allocating risk has been
repeatedly emphasized (Stiglitz, 1974, Newbery, 1977). The ability of landlords to enforce con-
tracts on land is a critical issue and the design of such contracts is the subject of many empirical
studies (Shaban, 1987). Dubois (2000) provides empirical evidence, using the same data as the
present paper, that sharecropping or other land contracts allow risk sharing. Households use
these instruments to smooth income as well as consumption (Morduch, 1995). Furthermore, Bell
(1988) and Udry (1994) have emphasized that formal contracts are often accompanied by infor-
mal transfers that attenuate their e¤ects in bad states of nature. Another branch of literature
from which we depart, focuses on the role of asymmetric information (see Thomas and Worrall,
1990, Doepke and Townsend, 2006, and references therein). The issue of formal and informal
risk sharing is also of wider importance apart from this specic application, as it is relevant to
many other domains including international debt, nance, the internal labor market or social
networks.
Outline and main ndings In Section 2, we construct and analyze a theoretical model of
long-term dynamic interactions between households in which several cases are nested: Complete
markets if all risks can be insured by formal contracts; A single non-contingent transfer as in
Gauthier, Poitevin and Gonzalez (1997); Limited commitment and no formal contracts as in
Ligon et al. (2002). A specic feature is that we embed both income and preference shocks into a
two-agent model in which one agent, who ultimately represents the villagecan commit himself
while the other agent (the household) cannot.
The market allocation (consumption, income and contracts) is obtained as an equilibrium of
an innite horizon game. Using recursive methods, we characterize constrained Pareto e¢ cient
allocations where an allocation species the sequence of contracts and informal transfers to be
implemented and which are possibly random to account for non-concavity issues. We then derive
optimality conditions and monotone comparative results. Any e¢ cient equilibrium allocation
is characterized by two monotone (stochastic) mappings: one maps current consumption into
contracts, and the other is an Euler equation in which consumption growth, instead of being a
martingale, is a¤ected by lagged consumption and current income.
In Section 3, we specify the econometric model. It involves two equations of interest: the Euler
equation of consumption dynamics and an income equation. We derive the testable predictions
of our theoretical model using this specication. One such prediction is that income monoton-
ically depends on lagged consumption. Other testable predictions include other monotonicity
restrictions as well as parametric restrictions across the income and consumption equations.
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In Section 4, the model is estimated by semi-parametric methods using a panel survey col-
lected in Pakistan by IFPRI at the end of the 1980s. Because of non linearities, we estimate the
model of income and consumption growth by penalized splines (Yu and Ruppert, 2002). Results
are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model and, in particular, lagged consump-
tion a¤ects income as predicted. The results hold true in the presence of measurement errors, of
superior information that households might have on future income shocks and of nutrition e¤ects
on productivity as the two last factors could generate a similar prediction. They are also robust
to assumptions about labor market imperfections. Among other results, the estimation of the
consumption growth equation leads to an estimate of a lower bound on the probability that a
self-enforcing constraint binds. This estimated bound is roughly equal to 15%.
In the last section, we discuss the economic relevance of our empirical results, the limitations
of our approach and future research avenues. We conclude by discussing some policy implications.
Proofs are in the appendix.
2 A Theoretical Model of Risk Sharing with Formal and
Informal Contracts
This section presents the theoretical model. We rst dene preferences, income processes, the
contractual environment as well as the timing of the game. Second, we characterize the con-
strained Pareto optimal allocations. To this end, we dene two Bellman equations at the ex-ante
and interim stages and discuss their properties. Building on this we propose a characterization
of the dynamics of income and consumption processes. Last, we extend the model to account
for the presence of observed heterogeneity.
2.1 The Model
We consider a two-agent framework and assume full commitment by one agent and none by the
other.2 Time is discrete and goes from 1 to innity, t = 1; :::;1. Let st denote a random state
of the world at date t, identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) on a nite support S.
The extension to a general Markov process is undertaken at the end of the section. State s
occurs with probability ps; and agent i receives exogenous resources !i (s) : There is no storage
possibility and no nancial market.
The utility function of agent 1 is written at date t  1 as ut(:) = tu(:); where (t)1t=1 is a
random process. In the empirical part, t represents the new information a¤ecting preferences
that is revealed at the beginning of a period and that is never observed by the econometrician. In
2We analyze the two-sided limited commitment case in a companion paper (Dubois, Jullien and Magnac
(2002)).
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the theoretical part, its presence ensures enough variability in the allocation, implying in partic-
ular that the problem is strictly concave and the allocation is uniquely dened with probability
1. Setting 0 = 1; we denote t =
t
t 1
and we follow the literature by assuming that t is i.i.d.
on an interval of R+, with mean 1 and positive density.
The second agent has non-stochastic preferences since what matters are ratios of marginal
utility between the two agents. Her preferences are described by a Von-Neumann Morgenstern
utility function v(:): We assume that u and v are concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable,
u(0) = v (0) = 0 and u0(0) = v0 (0) = +1 and this ensures that consumption levels are positive.
Both agents share the same discount rate : The ex-ante expected intertemporal utility of agents
1 and 2 are respectively E [
P1
t=1 
t 1ut(c1t )] and E [
P1
t=1 
t 1v(c2t )].
Because of convexity issues, we allow agents to implement random allocations. To this end,
we assume that there is a public random variable, "t, which is i.i.d. and continuous on a compact
support.
The precise timing of realization of the various events within period t, is the following.
 Interim stage: At the beginning of period t; the shocks t and "t are publicly realized. A
formal contract is signed.
 Ex-post stage: At the end of period t; the income shock st is publicly realized. The
formal contract is enforced. Then parties may complement it by voluntary transfers and
consumption takes place.
We shall also consider an ex-ante stage posterior to date t   1 consumption but anterior to
the realization of date t shocks t and "t:
Once signed, formal contracts are valid for period t and binding for both agents. They
are restricted and incomplete as follows:
1. Contracts are short term, specifying how resources will be shared within the period only.
2. Contracts can be contingent only on the realization of exclusive events e 2 E , where E is a
nite partition of the set of states of nature S: An event e 2 E is a subset of S; and occurs
with probability pe =
P
s2e ps.
3. Contracts entail real costs, while voluntary transfers involve no real cost.3
A contract is represented by a vector ((e))e of net transfers received by agent 1. Transfers
belong to some compact set e[(e); (e)], where (e) < 0  (e). Transferring  in event e
3This assumption is necessary to obtain an interior solution with one-sided commitment, it can be dispensed
with in the case of bilateral limited commitment (see Dubois et al. , 2002).
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through a contract entails a cost '(e; ) for agent 2: As a consequence, total resources in state
s 2 e are !1 (s)+!2 (s) '(e;  (e)):We assume that '(e; :) is continuously di¤erentiable, quasi-
convex, with a minimum '(e; 0) = 0 at  = 0. For conciseness, we also assume that the set of
contracts is such that both agents enjoy positive consumption levels in all states.4 This could
easily be relaxed by assuming that the transfers are set ex-post to the minimum between the
formal quantity and the agents resources (see our working paper, Dubois, Jullien and Magnac,
2005).
When no contract is feasible (E = ?), we obtain the model of informal risk sharing as in
Thomas and Worrall (1988). We obtain the polar case of complete contracting when E = S
and the cost of transfers is zero, '  0, over the relevant range (and  is su¢ ciently negative).
Moreover, our setting nests the model of Gauthier, Poitevin and Gonzalez (1997) since, among
other things, they consider one ex-ante transfer only (E = fSg i.e. card(E) = 1).
Denote Ht = [(sr 1; r; "r)r]
t
r=1 the history of shocks up to the beginning of period t. An
allocation is a random prole of formal transfers  t and consumptions cit that are measurable
with respect to the relevant information, i:e:  t = (Ht; et) and cit = c
i(Ht; st); and that satisfy
the resource constraint, for all Ht and st :
c1t  0; c2t  0; and c1t + c2t = !t; (1)
where !t = !1 (st) + !2 (st)  '(et;  t) denotes aggregate resources available at date t:
2.2 Intertemporal Payo¤s and Feasible Allocations
In the benchmark case in which nancial markets are complete, optimal insurance is achieved and
consumption at date t only depends on the realization of aggregate resources that are maximal
at (et) = 0. According to Borchs rule, the ratio of marginal utility is the same in all states of
nature so that consumption dynamics are characterized by
t+1
u0(c1t+1)
v0(c2t+1)
= t
u0(c1t )
v0(c2t )
:
In our set-up there is no nancial market, but agent 2 can fully commit to a set of future
actions while agent 1 cannot commit at all and at any point in time maximizes his payo¤. Any
equilibrium allocation must be self-supporting in a game theoretic manner.
Because of the presence of the random parameter t, our model is not strictly speaking a
repeated game. Yet, it is stationary in the sense that the sub-game starting at date t is identical
to the game starting at date 1 provided that the utility levels are re-normalized. To see that,
4More formally, for all e;  2 [(e); (e)] and s 2 e; !1 (s) +  > 0 and !2 (s)     ' (e; ) > 0.
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dene the expected utility at the beginning of date t; normalized by t for agent 1; as:
Ut = E
"
u
 
c1t

+
1X
r=1
r
t+r
t
u(c1t+r) j Ht
#
; Vt = E
" 1X
r=0
rv(c2t+r) j Ht
#
. (2)
Now consider the subgame starting at date t with Ht known. Given that
t+r
t
= rl=1t+l; the
distribution of
n
t+r
t
; "t+r; st+r
o
r1
is independent of the period t; and the subgame starting at
date t > 1 is identical to the initial game. The sets of equilibria of the two games coincide and
thus the tools of repeated game theory apply.
Specically, there are minimum and maximum expected utility levels that can be supported
in equilibrium for each agent. Since agent 2 can commit to transfer all her wealth, the minimum
level is V = 0: On the other hand agent 1 will reject any proposed agreement leading to a utility
level Ut below the autarky level:
U =
1
1  
X
s
psu(!
1 (s)):
Since agent 2 can commit not to contract at all with agent 1; U is indeed the minimum utility
that he can obtain.
In order to prevent agent 1 from reneging on the agreement, it is optimal to coordinate in such
a way that if he deviates, the equilibrium that follows is the worst equilibrium for him. In other
words one should apply an optimal penal code as dened by Abreu (1988): An allocation can
be supported in equilibrium provided that, at any point in time, agent 1 prefers to abide by the
informal agreement rather than to renege and be punished by receiving his minimum equilibrium
expected utility. Thus at date t, agent 1 should be willing to sign the formal contract at the
interim stage,
Ut  U: (3)
Once st is realized, at the ex-post stage, agent 1 must also prefer to make the informal transfer
rather than to enforce the formal contract only and continue in autarky next period:
u(c1t ) + E

t+1Ut+1 j Ht; st
  u(!1t +  t) + U . (4)
In conclusion, the set F of allocations that satisfy the resource constraint (1) ; the participa-
tion constraint (3) and the incentive compatibility condition (4) at all dates and all histories is
the set of feasible allocations.
2.3 Value Functions and Bellman Equations
Our goal is to derive the set of constrained Pareto optimal allocations. An allocation is optimal
if agent 1 receives the largest possible expected utility given agent 2s expected utility among
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the feasible allocations. This set, or frontier, can be evaluated at various stages. It will be useful
to consider two stages: before any shock is revealed, the ex-ante denition, or after revelation of
the shocks ( and ") at the beginning of the period, the interim denition.
Denition 1 At the interim stage, when H1 = (1; "1) is known, the Pareto frontier is the set
of feasible interim utility (P (V ); V ) characterized by the interim value function:
P (V ) = max
(c1t ;c2t ; t)
1
t=1
2F
U1 s:t: V1  V:
where U1 and V1 are date 1 normalized utility levels for agents 1 and 2 dened in equation (2) :
Denition 2 At the ex-ante stage, the Pareto frontier is the set of feasible ex-ante utility
(Q (V ) ; V ) characterized by the ex-ante value function:
Q (V ) = max
(c1t ;c2t ; t)
1
t=1
2F
E [1U1] s:t: E [V1]  V:
where the expectation operator refers to the joint distribution of (1; "1) :
Optimality implies that at any date the allocation remains optimal conditional on history
provided that agent 1 has not deviated. Thus, given stationarity, Ut = P (Vt) with probability 1.
Moreover, the interim and the ex-ante frontier are linked by the relationQ(E [V1]) = E1P (V1) :
Denote F (: j 1) the marginal distribution of date 1 utility V1 conditional on the realization of
the random shock 1 only. With the use of the random component "1; it is possible to implement
any distribution on support [V ; V ]; so that Q(V ) is the solution of the ex-ante Bellman equation
Q(V ) = max
fF (:j1)g
E
"Z V
V
1P (V1)dF (V1 j 1)
#
s:t: E
"Z V
V
V1dF (V1 j 1)
#
 V; (5)
where the expectation operator refers to the distribution of 1:
Again optimality implies that at any date:
E(tUt j Ht 1; st 1) = Q (E(Vt j Ht 1; st 1)) ; (6)
with probability 1. Notice that, using t+1 = t+1t :
Ut = E

u
 
c1t

+ t+1Ut+1 j Ht

; Vt = E

v
 
c2t

+ Vt+1 j Ht

:
Therefore, equation (6) implies that the solution of the interim program is such that:
Ut = E

u
 
c1t

+ Q (E(Vt+1 j Ht; st)) j Ht

: (7)
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Combining this with Ut = P (Vt) allows us to write the value function P (:) the solution to the
interim Bellman equation:
P (V ) = max
(c1 (s) ; c2 (s) ; V (s))s; ((e))e
X
s2S
ps

u
 
c1 (s)

+ Q (V (s))

(8)
s:t
X
s2S
ps

v
 
c2 (s)

+ V (s)
  V (9)
u
 
c1 (s)

+ Q (V (s))  u  !1 (s) +  (e)+ U 8e 2 E ;8s 2 e (10)
c1 (s) + c2 (s) = !1 (s) + !2 (s)  '(e;  (e)) 8e 2 E ;8s 2 e (11)
0 = V  V (s)  V 8s 2 S (12)
where the participation constraint (3) is embedded in constraint (12).
The solution to the interim Bellman equation (8) maps utility Vt into a formal transfer
 t; consumption levels cit and continuation expected utility at the end of period t contingent
on the realization of the shock st: Moreover, the solution of the ex-ante Bellman equation
(5) characterizes the distribution of period t+1 utility Vt+1 as a function of the expected utility
promised at the end of period t and of the shock t+1:
Using the argument of Thomas and Worrall (1988), the value functions Q(V ) and P (V ) are
decreasing and continuous on the interval [V ; V ]. We however need to address concavity and
di¤erentiability issues.
2.3.1 Properties of the interim value function
Consider the interim value function P: Since Q is concave, the program dening P is concave
for a xed contract ((e))e : However, when the contract is optimally designed, P (:) may not be
concave or di¤erentiable. Let P^ (:) be the convex hull of P (:) :
P^ (V ) = max
F2[V ; V ]
Z V
V
P (w)dF (w) s:t:
Z V
V
wdF (w)  V:
where F is a distribution on [V ; V ]: It is the distribution of Vt conditional on (Ht 1; st 1; t) ;
i.e. after realization of the shock t but before randomization.
P^ (V ) is a concave and decreasing function. The argument of Benveniste and Scheinkman
(1979) can then be adapted along the line of Koeppl (2006) to show that because the incentive
constraint cannot bind in all states, P^ (V ) is di¤erentiable at V < V (Lemma 8 in Appendix).
Furthermore, as the agents can randomize over Vt; P (Vt) = P^ (Vt) with probability 1 at an
optimal allocation. Moreover,
P^ 0(E [Vt j Ht 1; st 1; t]) = P 0(Vt) (13)
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whenever Vt < V (notice that 0 = V < Vt). Thus P is di¤erentiable with probability 1 over the
support of any optimal allocation.
The equality P (Vt) = P^ (Vt) has another consequence. As P^ is concave, duality theory yields
a relationship between the slope of the interim Pareto frontier and the interim utility of agent 2.
Lemma 3 There exists a random variable t =  P^ 0(Vt); measurable with respect to history Ht;
such that with probability 1 :
Vt 2 arg max
V 2[V ; V ]
fP (V ) + tV g : (14)
Proof. We have Vt 2 argmaxV
n
P^ (V )  P^ 0(Vt)V
o
since P^ (:) is concave. Using P^ (:) 
P (:); we obtain that when P (Vt) = P^ (Vt) then Vt 2 argmaxV
n
P (V )  P^ 0(Vt)V
o
: The result
then follows from Pr
n
P (Vt) = P^ (Vt)
o
= 1
The lemma implies that characterizing the set of optimal utility Vt amounts to characterizing
the solutions of program (14) for various values of t. In what follows, we describe the dynamics
using the Pareto weight t instead of Vt:
2.3.2 Properties of the ex-ante value function
Consider now the ex-ante value functionQ: Since the program is linear, the ex-ante value function
Q is concave, and, as P^ ; is di¤erentiable. In addition, we show in Lemma 9 (Appendix) that
function Q(:) is strictly concave thanks to the random e¤ect 1.
>From above, we must have E(U1 j 1) = P^ (E(V1 j 1)) at date 1: Denoting the set of
measurable functions from the support of 1 into [V ; V ] by B; the solutions of the ex-ante
Bellman equation (5) can be written as
Q(V ) = max
V^ (:)2B
E
h
1P^ (V^ (1))
i
s:t: E
h
V^ (1)
i
 V; (15)
which determines the choice E [V1 j 1] = V^ (1) for a given V and shock 1: More generally
V^ (t) is the choice of E [Vt j Ht 1; st 1; t] as a function of V = E [Vt j Ht 1; st 1] and t:
The ex-ante and the interim value function are thus linked by optimality conditions implying
that at V^ () < V solution to program (15), it must be the case that Q0(V ) = 1P^
0(V^ (1)):
Thus the slopes of the two value functions are linked by the relationship Q0(E [Vt j Ht 1; st 1]) =
tP^
0(Vt): Combined with (13), this provides a rst relation between the ex-ante and interim slopes
of the Pareto frontiers at an optimal allocation:
Q0(E [Vt j Ht 1; st 1]) = tP 0(Vt) when Vt < V : (16)
This expression is used below to describe how the (ex-ante) value anticipated at the end of period
t   1 is transformed into an (interim) expected value at the beginning of period t: A recursive
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characterization of an optimal allocation then consists in equation (16) and for any interim value
Vt; a description of the contract, current period consumption levels and the next period ex-ante
value as a function of realized shocks.
2.4 Dynamic Characterization
The characterization of the dynamics is obtained in several stages. The starting point uses
equation (16) above, relating the slopes of the ex-ante and the interim value functions. Suppose
that we know from past history the slope of the ex-ante value function Q0t: Then we can infer
the slope of the interim value function
t = P
0 (Vt) =
Q0t
t
: (17)
The next step consists in characterizing date t allocation as a function of the slope t: This is
done by solving the program (14) dening the interim frontier, i.e. by maximizing P (V ) + tV .
This amounts to solve the program given by the interim Bellman equation (8). As part of the
characterization we obtain the slope of the next period ex-ante value Q0t+1. We can then start
the process again to obtain a recursive characterization.
The solution to the interim Belman equation
max
(c1 (s) ; c2 (s) ; V (s) )s; ((e))e
X
s2S
ps

u
 
c1 (s)

+ Q (V (s))

+t
X
s2S
ps

v
 
c2 (s)

+ V (s)

subject to the incentive compatibility condition (10) ; the resource constraint (11) and the par-
ticipation constraint (12), is solved in two stages.
In a rst stage we x the contract ((e))e and the weight t of agent 2
0s utility, and we char-
acterize the solution (c1 (s) ; c2 (s) ; V (s))s: The benet of doing so is that the reduced program
is concave. This determines date t promised consumption levels and continuation utility for a
given contract ((e))e and t: A simple arbitrage condition shows that
u0(c1 (s))
v0(c2 (s))
=  Q0 (V (s)) : (18)
This corresponds to a risk sharing rule which determines the allocation in state s and which
trades o¤ consumption and continuation utility.
Moreover, in all states in which agent 1s incentive compatibility condition (10) is not binding,
we have Q0 (V (s)) = t; which equates the ratios of marginal utility across states, as required by
Borchs rule. However, when agent 1s income is (too) large, maintaining the ratio of marginal
utility at t violates incentive compatibility. The future utility allocated to agent 1 must be
increased to the level that he would obtain by reneging on the promise and enforcing the contract
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 (e). In this case the allocation depends on the resources available and on the outside option,
but not on the weight t:
In a second stage, we consider the choice of the formal contract for a given weight t. Although
a full characterization is out of reach, a super-modularity argument shows that the contract is
a monotonic function of the Pareto weight. As we move along the frontier P (V ) toward higher
absolute slopes  (and thus higher V ), the contract becomes uniformly less favorable to agent 1.
The next proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 4 Denote t = !1t +  t agent 1s income at date t. There exist a function  (!; )
with values in ( P^ 0( V );+1), and a correspondence T ();with values in e((e); 0] such that an
optimal allocation satises:
i)
( t(e))e 2 T (t); (19)
u0(c1t )
v0(c2t )
= min ft;  (!t ; t)g ; (20)
t+1 =
1
t+1
u0(c1t )
v0(c2t )
if Vt+1 < V : (21)
ii)  (!; ) is decreasing in ;
iii) T () is non-increasing according to the strong order set.5
iv) T (t) is single-valued with probability 1.
For a given formal contract, this proposition is a generalization of Thomas and Worrall (1988)
in which one agent is risk neutral and no formal contract is allowed. When agent 10s resources
are large or the weight put on agent 2 is large, incentive compatibility and e¢ cient risk sharing
are conicting. This is resolved in two ways. First, the consumption prole of agent 1 that
follows such a state is shifted upwards. Second, the problem can be alleviated ex-ante by using
the formal contract. As the utility V of agent 2 increases, it becomes more di¢ cult to maintain
the incentives of agent 1. Formal contracts are thus more extensively used.
The dynamics can be described by means of the evolution of the weight t associated with
the utility Vt chosen after history Ht. At this stage, agents sign a contract ( t(e))e 2 T (t).
Consumption is given as a function of t, the transfer  t and the state of nature st. This also
denes the slope Q0(E(Vt+1 j Ht; st)) at the end of period t. Then, at date t+1, Ht+1 is realized
and condition (16) gives the new value of the weight t+1.
5The transfer is strictly decreasing in all events such that the incentive constraint binds with a positive
probability and income is positive in some state. If the incentive constraint doesnt bind in all states of event e;
then the transfer is  (e) = 0.
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Whenever the Pareto frontier is locally strictly concave, T () is single valued so that the
proposition completely characterizes the dynamics. If P (:) is not strictly concave T () can be
multi-valued. Notice that it is single valued for all values t for which program (14) has a unique
solution, i.e. for which  P^ 0(Vt) = t has a unique solution Vt. It is shown in Lemma 9 (Appendix)
that this occurs with probability 1 due to the e¤ect of the shock t. Thus in equilibrium T (t)
is single valued with probability 1.
When there is no formal contract, the variable  (!t ; t) is exogenous. The dynamics of
consumption after a date t when the incentive constraint binds is independent of past history and
depends only on state st: Introducing the possibility of formal contracts dramatically changes
this conclusion. Indeed the resources of the agent depend on past history of shocks through
the contract Tt, even after a period in which the incentive constraint binds. Notice that the
proposition implies that income t is monotonic in the parameter t:
Corollary 5 Income t is non-increasing with t in all states st:
Proof. Condition iii) implies that transfer  t doesnt increase in all events when t increases.
Thus income is uniformly non-increasing.
The same conclusion holds for the allocation of consumption levels and future utility (c1t ; Ut+1).
6
Notice also that if there were no shock t; the weight t would be decreasing over time. It
would converge to some xed value and the contract should eventually be backloaded in favor
of the agent who cannot commit. But due to the shock t, there is a positive probability that
t increases. Thus starting from any point, there is a positive probability that the incentive com-
patibility constraint binds in nite time, and the asymptotic distribution of allocations is not
degenerate. For our argument to make empirical sense there must be enough variability in the
shocks t.
7
2.5 Additional sources of observed heterogeneity
We have thus far assumed time-invariant utility functions (except t) and a stationary resource
process. Suppose now that the utility is u(c1;x1t ) and v (c
2;x2t ). Suppose also that resources
depend on state st and that a state variable qt describes the information set. Letting xt = (x1t ; x
2
t );
suppose that (xt; qt) follows a Markov process whose realization is revealed to the agents at
the beginning of period t. Then the value functions at date t are functions P (V ;xt; qt) and
6This follows from the fact that at the solution of the sub-program with a given contract; both c2s and V (s) are
non-decreasing with  and non-increasing with (e).
7See Thomas and Worrall (1988), Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) and Ray (2002). We thank a referee for this
point and the references.
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Q(V ;xt 1; qt 1). The value function Q is the maximum
E
n
tP^ (Vt;xt; qt) j xt 1; qt 1
o
subject to E fVt j xt 1; qt 1g  V . The value function P (V ;xt; qt) is equal to the maximum of
E

u
 
c1(xt; qt; st);x
1
t

+ Q (V (xt; qt; st);xt; qt) j xt; qt

subject to incentive and participation constraints. All proofs generalize to this set-up. The
function  depends only on !t, t and xt; qt, but not on t, while the ratio of marginal utility
has to be conditioned on xit only. We thus obtain
u0(c1t ;x
1
t )
v0(c2t ;x2t )
= min ft;  (!t ; t;xt; qt)g :
The contract T (t;xt; qt) depends on t and xt; qt and the dynamics of the multiplier t are
unchanged.
3 The Structural Econometric Model
The main purpose of constructing an empirical model from these theoretical underpinnings is
to test whether it leads to an empirically credible alternative to the perfect insurance and the
limited commitment cases and to assess the degree of discrepancy with those. The new insight
that our theoretical set-up brings about is that we should analyze the income process in addition
to consumption growth. If income were exogenous, the hypothesis of complete markets would be
tested by looking at the signicance of the correlation between the residuals of the consumption
growth equation and income. This procedure is correct since income is excluded from the mar-
ginal utility of consumption if leisure and consumption are separable. In our case, the choice of
formal contracts makes income endogenous and there are indeed three endogenous variables (con-
sumption, formal contracts and income). A test procedure that markets are complete should now
be looking for exogenous or predetermined variables that a¤ect formal contracts, thus income,
and are independent of random preference shocks.8 Moreover, the absence of formal contracts,
the case of pure limited commitment, is evaluated by testing for income exogeneity. Nevertheless,
we want to achieve more than simply testing null hypotheses and this section focuses on formal-
izing an econometric model suited to the theory developed in the previous section and that can
be identied using household panel data on income and consumption. Alternatives have been
proposed in the literature to understand the empirical evidence that we obtain but we defer the
discussion of their relevance until the empirical section.
8The issue of income endogeneity is dealt with in some papers in a reduced-form setting (e.g. Jacoby and
Skouas, 1998, Jalan and Ravallion, 1999).
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Some discussion of the most striking omissions is nonetheless in order. The rst issue concerns
the adaptation of the two-agent framework to a village i.e. a multi-agent framework. We follow
Ligon et al. (2002) by assuming that each household plays a two-person game with the rest of the
village or with a pivotal person in the village. The characteristics and the equilibrium realizations
of endogenous variables of the other agent are written as village-and-period indicators.
The second issue is that we do not model individual savings or "investment" technologies that
would enable households to transfer resources from one period to the next in an idiosyncratic
way. As demonstrated by Ligon et al. (2000), the manipulation of incentive constraints becomes
intractable in empirical applications. The level of aggregate savings is assumed to be determined
by some unmodeled mechanism and captured by village-and-period dummy variables in the
empirical model.
Third, we use information on consumption and income only. It is di¢ cult to tell in the data
whether contracts are formal so that we only capture their impact through the income process.
Furthermore, we refrain from using information on informal transfers as Foster and Rosenzweig
(2001) do because it seems di¢ cult to us to draw a precise line between truly exogenous trans-
fers and those that result from the very endogenous informal contracts that we model here.
Consumption growth would eventually include those informal transfers (Deaton, 1997).
For the sake of clarity and for lack of a better device, we shall adopt the convention that
observablerefers from now on to variables which we, the econometrician, observe and we keep
the expression "revealed at time t" to designate what households observe at time t. Moreover,
we shall adopt the following notation:
Notation 3.1:
(i) All parameters indexed by "vt" control for village-and-period e¤ects.
(ii) Household is consumption at time t is denoted cit.
(iii) Household is agricultural prots at time t; net of input costs including non family labor
costs, are denoted ait. Household is income at time t; including income from formal contracts,
is denoted it = ait+
e
it where 
e
it is other income. The latter stands for other non-labor income
or exogenous transfers such as remittances from abroad (excluding informal transfers).
(iv) Observed preference shifters (household demographics for instance) and unobserved pref-
erence shocks, respectively denoted xit and it, are revealed to agents at the beginning of period
t.
(v) Besides taste shifters, the information set at the beginning of the period contains observed
variables qit (such as owned land) that are revealed to agents at the beginning of period t.
(vi) Income shocks are revealed at mid-period. Observed shocks9 are denoted zit (days of illness
9In the theoretical model, we should assume that zit and (xit; qit) are independent. If they are not, we would
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and craft income for instance), unobservable shocks are denoted it. The set of all observables
at mid-period is denoted mit = (xit; qit; zit):
We start below with the specication of utility functions, of formal contracts and of income
processes. We continue by stating the identifying restrictions. All specication assumptions and
restrictions are piled up into di¤erent items of Assumption 3.2. A proposition stating semi-
parametric identication follows and the section closes by explaining the estimation method by
penalized splines.
3.1 The Specication of Consumption and Income Equations
3.1.1 Consumption Dynamics
Following most papers in this literature (exceptions are Ogaki and Zhang, 2001, for HARA esti-
mation and Dubois, 2000, for heterogenous CRRA functional forms) we assume that households
have constant relative risk aversion and that other goods, such as leisure, are excluded:
Assumption 3.2(i): The ratio of marginal utility of consumption for household i at time t,
relatively to the marginal utility of the village, v, is written as
it
u0it(cit)
u0vt(cvt)
= it exp(vt) exp(xit):c
 
it (22)
where  > 0 and where the log of the marginal utility of the village is captured by the village
andperiod e¤ect vt. We denote it() = ln (cit)  xit the adjusted consumption index.
Write the multiplier it dened in equation (21) and specied by the marginal utility (22), as:
lnit =   lnit   it 1() + vt 1; (23)
where the rst di¤erence shocks is given by lnit = ln it   ln it 1. Consumption dynamics is
derived from the Euler equation (20) and the multiplier denition (23). Whether the incentive
constraint facing household i is binding or not denes two regimes:
  it() + vt = ln vt(it; xit; qit)
if   lnit   it 1() + vt 1 > ln vt(it; xit; qit)
  it() + vt =   lnit   it 1() + vt 1
if   lnit   it 1() + vt 1 < ln vt(it; xit; qit)
where the notation vt replaces  in the Euler equation (20) because aggregate resources are now
captured by the village-and-period index (Notation 3.1).
replace zit by the innovation in zit independent of (xit; qit) that is by the unanticipated income shock:
17
The functional form of the bound, ln vt(it; xit; qit), will be specied later on. Yet it should
be noted immediately that this bound is deterministic. It could implicitly be made random if
preference shifters and information variables (xit; qit) were allowed to include some unobserved
heterogeneity components. The structure of stochastic shocks however is already su¢ ciently rich
because of the income variable it. As we allow for measurement errors in income, the absence of
unobserved heterogeneity in (xit; qit) does not seem to be such a tight assumption in this model.10
Because we cannot observe whether the incentive constraint is binding or not, the two regimes
cannot be distinguished. As a consequence, the system of equations above is observationally
equivalent to a single equation describing the dynamics of consumption:
it() = vt + it:1fit  0g+ lnit; (24)
where:
it = vt 1   it 1()  lnit   ln vt(it; xit; qit): (25)
Two remarks are in order. First, complete markets is an interesting special case in which the
incentive constraints never bind. We have, it < 0; so that the usual Euler equation holds:
 ln cit = xit + (vt + lnit)=:
More generally, the existence of self-enforcing constraints implies that dynamics is sometimes
consistent with the predictions derived from the hypothesis of complete markets and sometimes
not, depending on the sign of it.
Secondly, when the incentive constraint is binding, the second term in the right hand side of
the Euler equation (24) is positive. It means that consumption growth is more than what would
be expected under full insurance. It is the rentto pay to keep the household in the self-enforced
informal arrangement when the income shock in the period is toofavorable for the household.
Variable it depends on the income process it that we now detail.
3.1.2 Formal Contracts and the Income Process
A formal contract is described by equation (19) in Proposition 4. The vector of formal transfers
(i.e. in any state e) is a function of the multiplier it and of variables belonging to the information
set (xit; qit):
 it =  vt(  lnit   it 1() + vt 1; xit; qit);
when the multiplier lnit is replaced by its specication using equation (23). We have in mind
that formal transfers  it can be supported by land-leasing contracts (in or out) such as share-
cropping contracts and their sharing rules or xed-rent contracts for which the rent is xed at
10A more di¢ cult issue that we do not deal with here, is the presence of unobserved household e¤ects in xit; qit.
Yet, household e¤ects are notoriously di¢ cult to handle in non-linear dynamic settings although some advances
could be made along the lines proposed by Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005).
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the village level. Reduced-form estimation indeed showed that such contracts do help sharing
risks (Dubois, 2000). By contrast, it seems dubious that labor contracts can be formally enforced
since permanent labor contracts are infrequently observed in village economies (see Bliss and
Stern, 1982).
As a consequence, agricultural prots is a function of the characteristics of these contracts
and in particular of the marginal utility of consumption it and of variables in the information
set (xit; qit). It is also a function of observed and unobserved income shocks zit and it that are
revealed after the signature of the contracts so that the reduced form of agricultural income is
(using mit = (xit; qit; zit), see Notation 3.1):
ait = 
a(  lnit   it 1() + vt 1;mit; it):
We could have specied a structural production function or the structural relationships between
the quantities of land under sharecropping and xed-rent contracts and marginal utility. Given
the complicated endogenous structure of land exploitation, this would be fraught with severe
robustness issues.
Household net income is not only composed of agricultural prots but also of non-agricultural
prots or other income, eit. For more generality, we also include 
e
it among variables zit (Notation
3.1(vi)), on top of adding it to ait: By adding some measurement errors, & it, and adopting
the semiparametric assumption that agricultural prots are a linear function, we nally obtain
measured income ~it  ait + eit + & it as:
Assumption 3.2(ii):
~it = vt + 0it 1() +mitm + 0 lnit + it + & it: (26)
where the village-and-period e¤ect, vt, absorbs parameters vt 1:
Corollary 5 implies that parameter 0 is positive which provides the rst restriction of our
model.
The equations describing consumption growth and income, (24) and (26), form our structural
model. Assumptions about shocks and incentive constraints can now be spelled out.
3.2 Identifying Restrictions and Reduced Forms
Notation 3.1 and the consumption growth and income equations (24) and (26) lead to the fol-
lowing list of covariates, wit = (ln cit 1, xit 1, xit, qit, zit) respectively standing for lagged con-
sumption, lagged and current preference shifters, information variables and other income shocks.
Identifying restrictions on heterogeneity terms, measurement error and predetermined variables
are stated as:
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Assumption 3.2 (ctd): (iii) The vector of unobserved shocks in preferences and income
(lnit; it) is independent of covariates wit and of measurement errors, & it, and is identically
distributed and independent across households and periods. It has an absolutely continuous dis-
tribution and its support is a compact set of R2.
(iv) Measurement error & it is mean-independent of covariates, wit; and is independent across
households and periods.
(v) Variables in wit = (ln cit 1; xit 1; xit; qit; zit) have a compact support in Rr. If wvt =
E(wit j v; t) denotes their expectations within a village-and-period, there is full within-variation
of the covariates i.e.:
rank (E [(wit   wvt)(wit   wvt)0] j v; t) = r
The independence assumption 3.2(iii) is slightly stronger than the ones generally used in
linear dynamic models. Non-linearities, due here to the presence of a bound, require more than
mean-independence assumptions. We also used the assumption of compact support in order
to facilitate the proof of identication. Assumption 3.2(iv) is weaker as it takes advantage of
linearity. Both assumptions 3.2 (iii & iv) make the covariate process wit weakly exogenous.
Assumption 3.2 (v) implies that the distribution function of predetermined variables wit is not
degenerate. This assumption is substantive since it would be violated if the information set does
not include at least one variable qit which is excluded from preferences (an asset variable for
instance). Such variables provide exogenous variability in income.
The nal step to complete the specication of consumption dynamics is to specify the bound
it appearing in equation (25). As income it, without measurement errors as described in
Assumption 3.1(iii), depends on marginal utility, lnit + it 1()   vt 1 and on the index,
vt + mitm + it, the unobserved variable it dened in equation (25) can be written as a
function of the following arguments:
it = (lnit + it 1()  vt 1; vt +mitm + it; xit; qit; vt);
where vt is a village-and-period e¤ect. Using the independence assumption 3.2(iii), we can
evaluate the conditional expectation of the non-linear term it1fit  0g of the consumption
growth equation (24) :
E(it1fit  0g j ln cit 1; xit 1; xit; qit; zit) 
H(it 1()  vt 1=; vt +mitm; xit; qit; vt);
where the positive function H is derived from the joint distribution function of (lnit; it).
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We did not follow this non-parametric route11 and chose to specify the bound as a linear
index:
Assumption 3.2 (ctd): (vi) ln vt(it; xit; qit) is linear in all its arguments.
We then have:
Lemma 6 Under Assumption 3.2 (vi), it is linear in all its arguments:
it =  (1 + 0
@ ln vt
@it
)(it 1() +mitm + vt) + "
0
it(it; it)
Furthermore:
E(it1fit  0g j ln cit 1; xit 1; xit; qit; zit) = H(it 1() +mitm + vt) (27)
where H(:) is an unknown positive, decreasing, convex and twice di¤erentiable function, where:
H 0 (it 1() +mitm + vt) =  Pr(it > 0):(1 + 0
@ ln vt
@it
) < 0 (28)
and if there is more than one z variable,
z(j)=z(1) = z(j)=z(1) for any j > 1. (29)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Summarizing those results, the structural model consists of the following equations: First the
consumption growth moment condition derived from equation (24) and equation (27) is:
E(:it() vt j ln cit 1; xit 1; xit; qit; zit) = H(it 1() +mitm + vt): (30)
Second, using equation (26), the income moment condition is:
E(~it j ln cit 1; xit 1; xit; qit; zit) = vt + 0it 1() +mitm (31)
We allow for correlation between these equations. This correlation is not informative about the
parameters of interest since it depends on the unrestricted joint distribution of random shocks.
We now study the identication of the system of structural equations (30) and (31).
3.3 Semi-Parametric Identication
The model depends on the following population parameters:
 = (; ; 0; m; m) 2 ; % = (fvt; vt; vtgvt) 2 ; H(:) 2 H:
11The proof of identication remains however very similar in this more general case. It su¢ ces to condition on
mit and village-and-period e¤ects in the following.
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where  is the parameter of interest. Village-and-period e¤ects, %; and the functional parameter
H(:) are treated as nuisance parameters. The identication analysis proceeds as follows.
First, parameter  > 0 is not identied since the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
not identied in an Euler equation when the interest rate is unknown. The two equations of
interest are invariant to transforming the vector of parameters (, 0, vt, H(:)) into (1, 0=,
vt=, H(:)=) (holding other parameters constant). We shall therefore normalize  = 1 and
change the interpretation of other parameters accordingly.
Second, the parameters of the reduced form of the income equation (31), vt, 0,  0, m
are identied because of the full rank assumption 3.2(v). This is the most one can get from
the income equation. As 0 and  0 are identied,  is identied which shows that, in the
consumption growth equation (30), the dependent variable it() = ln cit xit is identied. The
consumption equation,
E(it() j it 1();mit) = vt +H(it 1() +mitm + vt); (32)
is an index model which identication is analyzed by Ichimura and Lee (1991). We adapt their
assumptions to our special case as H is a positive, decreasing and convex function (Lemma 6)
and as all regressors are bounded. The main problem we have to face is that the intercept term is
identied at innity only (Heckman, 1990). We restrict function H and its argument as follows:
Assumption 3.2 (ctd):
(vii) For any (v; t) and at the true parameter value, the support of  1+mm; is a connected
interval of R: Denote a1vt the value such that:
Median( 1 +mm + a1vt) = 0;
The support of  1 +mm + a1vt is denoted S
(v;t)
I :
(viii) H is the set of bounded, decreasing, convex and twice di¤erentiable functions taking
values on [v;tS(v;t)I and such that H(0) = 0.
As shown in the proof of the next proposition, assumptions (vii & viii) are normalizations if
we observe one village at one period. The identication of H follows from the normalization of
its location and the location of its argument. Imposing these conditions for any village at any
period is testable although the assumption is weak. In its absence, identication would not be
robust to small departures from the other assumptions that H(:) does not directly depend on
v; t which would be generated by allowing for heteroskedasticity in it for instance. Finally, we
cannot impose that function H(:) is positive.
All these conditions are su¢ cient to obtain:
Proposition 7 Under Assumption 3.2 (i-viii), (;H) is identied in H.
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Proof. See Appendix B
3.4 Estimation using Penalized Splines
To estimate the parameters of the consumption growth equation (32), we use penalized spline
regression following Yu and Ruppert (2002). Letting u = it 1() +mitm, properly normalized
using Assumption 3.2 (vii), we choose function H(:) in the following set:
H(u; ) = 1u+ :::+ pu
p +
K 1X
k=1
p+kSp(u  k)
where
Sp(u  k) =

(u  k)p1fu > kg for k > p=2
(k   u)p1fu < kg for k  p=2
where 1fAg is the indicator function of A.
Parameters to estimate are (; m; fvtg; ) where fvtg is the collection of village-and-
period e¤ects and where  is the vector of parameters of the spline. The number of knots K 1 is
considered xed (see Ruppert, 2002, for a procedure of selection) and the locations of the knots
k are supposed to be given by the 1=K-quantiles of u. By construction H(0) = 0.
The estimation method consists of nding the global minimum of:
Q(; m; fvtg; ) =
X
i;t
(it() vt  H(it 1() +mitm; ))2 + :0G
where  is a penalty weight. We chose to penalize equally the elements p+1 to p+K 1 writing:
0G =
K 1X
k=1
2p+k
so that we do not impose that function H(:) is decreasing and convex. The reader is referred to
Yu and Ruppert (2002) for all proofs of asymptotic properties including the sandwich formula
for the variance-covariance matrix of estimates.12
4 The Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data Description and Economic Analysis
The data come from a survey conducted by IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute)
in Pakistan between 1986 and 1989 (see Alderman and Garcia, 1993, for a thorough presentation)
whose information is roughly equivalent to the famous ICRISAT dataset. The survey consists of
12Other details concerning the algorithm, the choice of the smoothing parameter  by generalized cross-
validation and the choice of other regularization parameters are presented in the working paper version (Dubois
et al., 2005).
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a random sample of around 900 households interviewed 12 times and coming from four districts
in three regions. This rich data set conveys information on household demographics, incomes
from various sources, individual labor supply, endowments and owned assets, agrarian structure,
crops and productions, and land contracts such as sharecropping and xed rent.
Our endogenous variables are income and consumption growth. Sources of income are wages,
agricultural prots, rents from property rights and pensions. Agricultural prots are computed at
each survey round using the information since the previous round and consist of cash income from
staples, milk products, animal poultry and livestock production, net of total input expenditures
including non-family wage costs, feeding costs of productive animals, fertilizers and pesticides.
Whether or not family labor costs should be substracted from agricultural prots is evaluated
below. Other sources of income such as households handicraft income, asset income including
property rents, xed pensions regularly received from the government and rentals of other assets
and non-agricultural labor income are considered as "other income". Household wage income
in o¤-farm agricultural tasks are considered as one of the support of informal transfers and is
not included in income. Concerning the consumption variable, we choose food expenditures as
our consumption variable because they represent the largest part of non-durable expenditures
and are well measured. More details on the consumption variables are given in Appendix C and
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
In our model, observed heterogeneity between households are of di¤erent types: Preferences,
x, other variables in the information set, q; or unanticipated shocks z. First, Dubois (2000)
showed using the same data that household size is the main preference shifter. Other variables
such as the number of children never proved to be signicant. As for variables in the information
set, various empirical analyses (see Jalan and Ravallion, 1999, for instance) report evidence that
contrasting rich and poor households is the main relevant di¤erentiation when the complete
markets hypothesis is evaluated. As income is endogenous in our model, the quantity of owned
land is a good indicator of a households productive assets and a predetermined predictor of
income. The quantity of owned rainfed land gives additional information about the quality of
productive land. These two variables constitute the information set, denoted qit above. Third,
craft or trade prots or spells of illness of household members are unlikely to be contractible and
are regarded as a component of unexpected income shocks, zt.
Decomposing the variance of agricultural income into the village-and-period variance, the
household variance and a residual one, conrms that rural households are mostly a¤ected by
large idiosyncratic risks. It is also true for other sources of income like asset income, wages and
other income. In contrast, 52.7% of the variance of the logarithm of food expenditures comes
from village-and-period e¤ects and 23.7% from household e¤ects. The rst component refers to
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aggregate shocks, the second to the relative economic status of the household in the village, i.e.
its Pareto weight. We nd the same pattern when looking at expenditures corrected by household
size or at total expenditures. Turning to rst di¤erences in the logarithm of food expenditures,
we nd substantial though quite imperfect risk sharing since village-time e¤ects explain 24.1%
of these changes, and household e¤ects explain 2.2%.13 Of course, the variance decomposition of
marginal utility also depends on preference shifters and rst di¤erencing magnies measurement
errors. Nevertheless, testing whether income shocks a¤ect consumption growth controlling for
preference shifters allowed one of the authors to reject perfect risk sharing using this dataset
(Dubois, 2000).
Finally, the land rental market is very active in these villages since we observe in the data that
the per period rate of change of area under contract such as sharecropping and xed rent is 20%
on average. This statistic provides a lower bound for the frequency of contract changes because
we are not able to observe with whom the household contracted or contractual changes that did
not involve a change in the land area under contract. This conrms that these contracts, which
are natural candidate empirical counterparts for our formal contracts, are subject to frequent
renegotiation.
4.2 Structural Estimates
When interpreting the results of the estimation of the income and consumption growth equations
that are presented below, we shall examine the empirical relevance of the following testable
structural restrictions:
C1 : 0  0: monotonicity of the contract with respect to lagged marginal utility as derived
from Corollary 5.
C2 : The coe¢ cients of preference shifters xit 1 in the income equation, and in both linear
indices of the consumption growth equation, are all equal to .
C3 : H is decreasing.
There are also other restrictions derived from auxiliary econometric assumptions in Assump-
tions 3.2 (i-viii) that we directly describe in the text.
4.2.1 The Income Equation
We present several sets of estimation results of the income equation (26) in Table 2. As predicted
by our model, the signicance of the coe¢ cient of lagged consumption in the income equation
13At the district level, risk sharing is signicantly less e¤ective and it is why we decided to pursue the analysis
at the village level.
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provides some evidence that households smooth income. In column 1, we report two stage least
squares estimates. This procedure controls for the presence of measurement error in lagged
consumption by introducing residuals of the instrumental regression of lagged consumption on
other variables of the regression and a further lag of consumption. The estimated coe¢ cient
of those residuals is indeed signicant and is three times larger than the OLS estimate of the
coe¢ cient of lagged consumption. We also tested for the presence of measurement errors in
the other variables using lags and we did not reject their exogeneity. A robustness analysis to
econometric assumptions is detailed in Section 4.2.3 below.
In conformity with restriction C1, the coe¢ cient of lagged consumption 0 is positive and
signicant. We also tried to use total expenditures with quite similar results. Yet, competing
explanations that we now detail could be consistent with this result.
Household superior information If all relevant information is not included in the income
equation, the signicantly positive coe¢ cient of lagged consumption in the income equation could
also reect lagged consumption being a good indicator of the information that households have
about future income shocks that we, as analysts, do not observe. If households have superior
information, income and lagged consumption are indeed positively correlated.
In order to investigate the importance of this e¤ect, we use, as proposed by Campbell (1987),
another decision variable that might reveal the superior information that households have on
future income shocks under the assumption that this information is single dimensional. To be
on par in terms of information with contractual decisions, this decision should be coincident
with the signature of contracts. Net-rented in area14 is such a candidate variable since it is a
productive factor. We regress net rented-in area on variables that are known at the beginning of
the period and we interpret residuals as a measure of the superior information that households
have. Table A.1 reports results of this estimation. The regression is very well determined and
lagged consumption, which is instrumented as before, negatively a¤ects rented-in area. Note
that it is because lagged consumption is instrumented that residuals indeed contain new superior
information if any.
In the second column of Table 2, the residual of the rented-in land equation used as infor-
mation controls is found to be signicant. Households have superior information and, as the
coe¢ cient is negative, tend to rent-in more land in anticipation of an adverse shock in income
either in o¤-farm or on-farm activities. Our prediction C1 of a positive e¤ect of lagged consump-
tion is nevertheless robust to the presence of superior information. The estimated coe¢ cient of
lagged consumption remains signicant and positive although it decreases marginally.
14or equivalently cultivated land as owned land is controlled for.
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Nutrition e¤ects on productivity The positive e¤ect of lagged consumption on income
could also be due to nutrition e¤ects on future productivity since more food consumption can help
improve the productivity of agricultural laborers as analyzed by Behrman, Foster and Rosenzweig
(1997) and Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1999). Both articles use working samples extracted from
the same survey as us.
When planting labor e¤ort is incompletely rewarded in the labor market and the productivity
of labor is assumed to depend on current consumption, Behrman et al. (1997) argue that planting
stage calories positively a¤ect harvest stage prots. Using a subsample of wheat producers at
two pairs of planting and harvest periods, they report empirical evidence about this positive
relationship.
The availability of data on calorie intakes at the household level actually allows us to dis-
tinguish a nutrition e¤ect from the mechanism of risk sharing though formal contracting. As
expected, calorie consumption and food expenditures are correlated although we found no e¤ect
of lagged calorie intakes on income when we use this variable along with or instead of food ex-
penditures.15 For instance, column 3 of Table 2 shows that when lagged food expenditures and
lagged calorie intakes are both included in the estimation, the coe¢ cient of lagged expenditures
only is signicantly di¤erent from zero. When using only lagged calorie intakes without food ex-
penditures, the former estimated coe¢ cient is not signicant. The discrepancy with the results
cited above might come from di¤erences in the sample selection and construction of the data.
In particular, by using all periods, we show that harvest stage consumption has an impact on
the next planting stage prots as well. This is di¢ cult to reconcile with a pure nutrition e¤ect
on productivity. As an aside, independent variation of food expenditures and calories reveal
that preferences over food matter more for households than the productive rôle of food through
calorie intakes.
As nutrition could have longer term e¤ects, we also use information about the body mass
index weight over height squared of household members. This variable is positively correlated
with food calorie intakes. Introducing the average or total body mass index of household adults,
or of male adults only, as additional variables, does not change the main results and shows a
small positive but insignicant e¤ect on productivity (column 4 of Table 2). This is in line with
Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1999) who nd that such impacts are small.
Labor market imperfections Our construction of agricultural prots in the income equation
assumes that the labor market is imperfect. We do not substract family labor costs from agri-
cultural prots so that we implicitly assume that there are no substitutes for family labor on
15As lagged food expenditures, lagged calorie intakes are instrumented by the second lag of calorie intakes
because of measurement errors.
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the market. A polar assumption would be that labor markets are perfect. As a consequence,
the construction of agricultural prots should be modied and they should be computed net of
family labor costs. This is what we did by using village-level information on male and female
wages at each period as well as male and female hours of work to impute family labor costs. The
income equation results hardly change and if any e¤ect, the coe¢ cient of lagged consumption in
the income equation is larger by a non signicant factor of 10%. We also repeated the analysis
substracting either male or female labor costs with no change.
Other determinants Regarding the estimated coe¢ cients of other variables in Table 2, house-
hold demographics should partly compensate the e¤ect of lagged consumption, and lagged house-
hold size indeed does, though insignicantly. The quantity of owned land a¤ects household in-
come although rainfed land compensates it so that their di¤erence, irrigated land, only seems to
matter. A larger number of days of illness for males and females decreases income as expected
though insignicantly. Informal transfers could take the form of additional labor from the village
that compensate for the sickness of household members since it might be less costly to intervene
at that stage than afterwards (Fafchamps, 1992). Sickness would not a¤ect household income
in that case but the way we construct income would be contaminated by informal transfers that
are implicitly already smoothing it. Errors in self-reporting wealth is another possible explana-
tion (Strauss and Thomas, 1998) but our data limitations preclude any further analysis of these
arguments. Finally, other income is positive and very signicant. We tested and did not reject
the exogeneity of this variable, using the various individual income components as instruments.
4.2.2 Consumption Growth Equation
In Table 3, we report the estimates of the consumption growth equation using penalized spline
regressions. The number of knots of the spline is small and equal to 8 and the penalization
parameter is optimally chosen by Generalized Cross Validation for the specication corresponding
to column 1.
We estimate the system of income and consumption growth equations by allowing for some
correlation between equations. This correlation is insignicant in magnitude (0.001) and sta-
tistically. The likelihood ratio statistic contrasting estimations allowing or not for correlated
equations is equal to 0:4 and has one degree of freedom. It shows that even if residual shocks in
income are correlated with the residuals of consumption growth through incentive constraints,
the inuence of these shocks is small relative to measurement errors in both equations and pref-
erence shocks in consumption dynamics. We do not report the estimates of the income equation
because they are very similar to what is reported in Table 2.
As before, we follow a control function approach in non-linear models (see Blundell and Powell,
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2003) and we introduce, as an explanatory variable, the residual of the regression of lagged
consumption on its second lag and all other variables to take into account the measurement
errors in lagged consumption. Consumption exogeneity is rejected very strongly indeed and
the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient denotes the presence of large measurement errors in
consumption. In column 2 we also introduce the residual of the net rented-in area equation (Table
A-1) as a control for superior information. It is very signicant (the likelihood ratio statistic for
the system of equations is around 60 and has two degrees of freedom) though it does not a¤ect
the estimation of the other coe¢ cients.
We now consider testing the restrictions C2 and C3. First, the hypothesis that the coe¢ -
cients of preference variables in the consumption and income equations are equal (C2) cannot be
rejected. The likelihood ratio statistic is equal to 1.4 in column 2 of Table 3. It has two degrees
of freedom although we should account for the fact that we were unable to precisely estimate
the coe¢ cients of lagged household size in both linear indices because function H() is close to a
linear function (see below). Nevertheless, even if H() is linear and the statistic has one degree of
freedom only, we cannot reject restriction (C2) at any reasonable level of condence.
Figure 1 reports estimates of the function H(:) using optimal smoothing. Although it should
not be taken as a formal test, its shape is not in contradiction with hypothesis (C3) as it is
decreasing. Incentive constraints bind with some strictly positive probability and the model is
statistically able to capture the type of market incompleteness at work in this economy. Moreover,
recall from equation (28) that the slope of H(:) is the product of the probability that an incentive
constraint is binding multiplied by 1 + 0
@ ln vt
@it
> 0. As @ ln vt
@it
< 0 (see Appendix B), the slope
is a lower bound on this probability and a rough estimate of this probability is equal to 0.15.
We analyze the most complete results of Table 3, Column 2, by starting with parameters
in the linear index of the equation of consumption growth. As expected, household size has a
positive and signicant e¤ect on the marginal utility of consumption in a way that is comparable
to what was obtained in a more usual setting (Dubois, 2000). It is more di¢ cult to analyze the
e¤ects of variables in the linear index which is the argument of function H(:). Remember that
the larger this index is, the smaller is the probability that the incentive constraint binds. Positive
coe¢ cients indicate that we are moving away from the constraint. It is only the case for variables
such as male days of illness (though the e¤ect is insignicant) and for information controls that
we have seen to be negatively correlated to income (Table 2). It is negative for household size,
land assets, female days of illness and other income. Intuitively, we should expect that benecial
income shocks should increase the probability that the incentive constraint binds.
Nevertheless, theory does not completely comfort these insights because there could be com-
pensating e¤ects due to the information, correlated with these variables that a¤ect the contracting
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choices of the household. It is what is observed, however, for all variables except for female days
of illness which is an intriguing result. As already mentioned, the issue that days of illness can be
immediately compensated by informal transfers of labor seems to us to be an interesting way to
explore. Moreover days of illness could a¤ect function H(:) in a more complicated way if the as-
sumption of independence (A3.2(iii)) in this regressor is violated. As a matter of fact we did test
another consequence of independence (A3.2(iii)) in unexpected income shocks (equation (29))
and we were able to reject this restriction. More complicated dependence of H on zt; stemming
from heteroskedasticity of it+1 for instance, should thus be allowed for.
As residual variances in income are larger after the rst half of the sample period (see below),
we split the sample into two periods and re-estimated the consumption growth equation. Results
are reported in the two last columns of Table 3 and are very stable across sub-samples although
many estimates lose their signicance. In Table A-2, we report tests of the separability of
consumption and leisure obtained by regressing the residuals of the consumption growth equation
on male and female labor supply variables. None are signicant and we do not reject separability.
4.2.3 Robustness analysis
A thorough analysis of serial correlation and sensitivity to auxiliary parameters used in penalized
spline regression is presented in Dubois et al. (2005) and we briey summarize it now.
Serial Correlation in Incomes Analyzing the autocorrelation of unobservables a¤ecting in-
come, we found that during the sample period, two subperiods can be distinguished, the rst
one with small variances (till round 7), the second one with a lot more variance. Alderman
and Garcia (1993) report that the sample period was a quite uncertain and troubled period for
agricultural activities, yet it seems to be true above all for the second half of the sample period.
This overall view does not indicate the presence of strong household specic e¤ects. We
also tried to rst-di¤erence the income equation but we lost all signicance. The main question
that remains is whether households are aware of the structure of autocorrelation because we use
econometric restrictions that they are not. More prosaically, the presence of serial correlation
might also modify standard errors of the estimates of the income equation. We did try to correct
for serial correlation by assuming that it is unrestricted over time but constant across individuals.
It indeed modied standard errors of coe¢ cients though by a maximal factor of 50% without
a¤ecting any diagnostic of signicance that was used using the robust to heteroskedasticity White
correction (Table 2).
Serial Correlation in Consumption Growth We computed the residual variances of the
consumption growth equation along with their autocorrelations. In contrast to income residuals,
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there is no clear time pattern for consumption residual variance, only two peaks at rounds 6 and
9. They might be attributed to measurement errors since the length of the period is somewhat
variable across rounds even though we considered weekly income and consumption levels. The
pattern of autocorrelation is more surprising since rst-order correlation varies between -0.2 and
0.05, second-order correlation between -0.17 and 0, third-order correlation between 0 and 0.10
and fourth-order correlation between 0.05 and 0.15. In the case in which the function H(:) is
linear, we develop in Dubois et al. (2005) a model with i.i.d. preference shocks and classical
measurement errors and we calibrate it on our data. Autocorrelation coe¢ cients are broadly in
line with the empirical ones. The calibration also shows that the magnitude of preference shocks
and measurement errors are roughly equal in the residuals of the consumption growth equation.
Other auxiliary parameters The auxiliary parameters in penalized spline regression are the
penalization parameter, the number of knots and the order of the spline. The income equation
is not a¤ected by the variations in these parameters as correlation between equations is virtually
equal to zero.
Making the penalization parameter vary between one tenth of its optimal value and ten
times its optimal value produces no noticeable di¤erence on estimated coe¢ cient values but only
di¤erences in estimated standard errors for some coe¢ cients. We tested structural restrictions
by using likelihood ratio statistics which are more robust than Wald tests. We also ran the
same kind of experiment by varying the number of knots and the order of the splines. In all
cases, the central results of this paper remain the same though standard errors seem a¤ected
by those auxiliary parameters. Regarding the estimates of function H(:) when the order of the
spline varies, it is much smoother using quadratic and cubic splines although the estimation using
linear splines does not contradict our main empirical conclusions.
Spatial correlation We also estimated auxiliary regressions of cross-products of income resid-
uals and of cross-products of consumption growth residuals within a village on the absolute
di¤erence between households of characteristics such as land assets or household size. These
regressions are intended to investigate whether unexplained components of consumption growth
and income are associated across households of similar characteristics in each village. Results are
reported in Table A-3. Interestingly the cross-product of residuals is always a negative function
of the distance of characteristics between households. Furthermore, while the distance in land
assets have a strong inuence on the cross-product between income residuals, their inuence is
much attenuated in the consumption growth equation. This is not the case for the distance in
household size. In the absence of household xed e¤ects, it is tempting to interpret these results
as consistent with partial risk sharing of productivity shocks attached to asset levels but no risk
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sharing of demographic shocks.
5 Discussion & Extensions
We elaborated a theoretical setting which nests the case of complete markets when all risk can
be insured by formal contracts and the case in which only informal agreements are available.
Its empirical implementation builds upon the estimation of an Euler equation of consumption
dynamics and an income equation using data from village economies in Pakistan.
Overall, our results indicate that those villages are far from the case of perfect risk sharing
in which lagged consumption would explain neither income nor consumption growth or from the
case of limited commitment in which lagged consumption would not explain income. Both cases
are rejected in signicant way. The importance of formal contracts and limited commitment can
be evaluated from the empirical estimates of the two structural equations. First, from results
in Table 2, we can derive that 12% of the within-village variance of income is explained by
lagged consumption and lagged preference shifters and we have been arguing that this comes
from formal contracting. Specically, while information variables including land assets explain
four times as much as "other income", formal contracts are on a par with "other income" in
terms of explaining the total within-village variance of agricultural prots. Income smoothing
due to formal contracting is thus economically signicant. Second, we can also evaluate the
explanatory power provided by limited commitment and formal contracts in the consumption
growth equation although it is low, as usual with consumption growth. Whereas 24% of the
variance of consumption growth is explained by village-and-period e¤ects, only 1.6% is explained
by the non linear function H(:) and its arguments and 0.3% by preference shifters. Nonetheless,
as incentive constraints do not bind at all periods, one in seven being the estimated lower bound
of the frequency of its occurrence, the economic magnitude of such a result is still signicant.
Policy evaluation by simulation would require full structural estimates, as discussed in the
limitations below. Nonetheless, we can already draw interesting policy implications.
First, by providing evidence on the impact of informal agreements, our work points to impor-
tant but often neglected mechanisms interlinking formal and informal agreements. This is in line
with evidence on contract interlinkages (Bell, 1988). One consequence is that short term land
agreements react to future anticipated shocks in a non trivial way, since anticipations a¤ect the
incentives to renege on informal agreements. Our analysis also corroborates evidence explaining
in part the success of micro-credit that relies on similar informal mechanisms.
Moreover, the dimension of informal risk sharing should be incorporated both into the eval-
uation and into the design of development programs. Specically, the policy designer should
evaluate whether an intervention complements informal agreements or weakens the ability of
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agents to cooperate. In the latter case, gains in terms of access to new instruments or markets
should outweigh the cost in terms of lost commitment. As Albarran and Attanasio (2003) show,
policies that aims at improving formal risk sharing could crowd out informal mechanisms.
Furthermore, the focus on commitment issues also suggests designing policies that improve
the enforceability of contracts within communities, prior to extending the set of contractual
parties (e.g. governments, banks, international institutions ...). It may also be desirable to
adjust interventions at the local level, with eld studies aiming at identifying and exploiting
channels of informal risk sharing. Localized programs may in particular aim at identifying the
credible parties (able to commit), and associating them to policy.
Much remains to be done before one can draw a complete picture of the role of informal
agreements in village economies. In a companion paper (Dubois et al., 2002), we analyze a
model in which no agent can commit. Conclusions about contract monotonicity are preserved
although the dynamics of the ratio of marginal utility is a¤ected by a second threshold which
corresponds to the incentive constraint of agent 2.
Besides, although here we focused attention on short-term contracts, our theoretical and
empirical conclusions should extend to the case of longer but nite horizon contracts, provided
that these contracts can be renegotiated every period at no cost. What really matters is the
ability to use contracts to a¤ect the distribution of the outside options of the agents. Long
term contracts can be used to a¤ect the continuation utility of deviating agents, and then can
be renegotiated (including voluntary cancellation of contracts) to improve the e¢ ciency of the
future relationship.
It was out of the scope of the paper to try to identify structural correspondence functions
between the space of contracts and the marginal rate of substitution of consumption between
two successive periods. It is nevertheless high on the research agenda since it would lead to full
structural modelling allowing simulation of the impact of economic policies. Whereas we posited
a reduced form for modeling the incentive compatibility constraint, the precise determination
of which contracts can be enforced would lead to the determination of the full structure. This
line of research would certainly involve simplifying the description of risks that households face
and contracts that they can use. Our analysis provides support for the relevance of our setting
thereby encouraging to attempt such a construction.
The issue of saving, and more generally of any device linking one period to the next (nutrition,
investment in agricultural technology,...) is di¢ cult to address. Some recent progress has been
made by Gobert and Poitevin (2006) in the case of public savings. They assume that breaching
an informal agreement triggers the loss of the saving assets. It would make sense in our context
if the asset was borne by the agent who is able to commit. Beyond consumption smoothing,
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savings provide resources that can be used as collateral of informal promises and that help relax
incentive constraints. When savings are publicly monitored but privately owned, it would a¤ect
the outside options of a deviant agent and would also raise convexity issues (see Ligon et al.,
2000). Another critical issue is asymmetric information when savings are not publicly observed.
As pointed up by Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), hidden savings drastically limit the ability to
use even formal contracts.
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6 Tables & Figure
Table 1: Descriptive statistics16
Descriptive statistics (all periods, 8053 observations)
Variable Average Std. Err.
Food consumption 176.29 103.21
Other non durable expenditures (heating, ..) 43.66 188.98
Total owned land area (acres) 9.42 21.81
Land owner (0:landless, 1:owner) 0.60 0.48
Total Land Owned in Village (acres) 6.66 13.2
Irrigated land (acres) 3.32 8.94
Non irrigated land (acres) 1.79 4.76
Household size 7.73 2.73
Number of children (15years) 4.56 2.21
Number of days of illness per week (male) 0.52 1.75
Number of days of illness per week (female) 0.25 0.90
Pensions 18.76 199
Agricultural prots -169.0 656.7
Transfers 87.03 408.2
Other income 154.1 628.3
Total income (without transfers) 151.19 840.7
Sharecropping dummy variable (renting in) 0.35 0.47
Fixed rent dummy variable (renting in) 0.08 0.26
Total area under sharecropping (renting in), (acres) 2.65 4.96
Total area under xed rent (renting in), (acres) 0.47 3.39
Total area under sharecropping (renting out), (acres) 2.55 9.84
Total area under xed rent (renting out), (acres) 0.35 3.80
16All income and expenditure variables are in Rupees per week.
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Table 2: Income Equation17
Dependent variable: ~it (2SLS)
0 (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.194 0.177 0.169 0.166
(0.060) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061)
 0
lagged (log) household size 0.032 0.035 0.013 0.016
(0.079) (0.079) (0.092) (0.092)
q
total land in village 0.149 0.150 0.149 0.148
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
rainfed land in village -0.195 -0.193 -0.195 -0.195
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
x
(log) household size -0.129 -0.125 -0.133 -0.134
(0.079) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081)
z
female illness days -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
male illness days -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
other income 0.159 0.157 0.157 0.157
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Consumption Residuals -0.135 -0.116 -0.112 -0.109
(for ln ct 1 equation in lags) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064)
Information controls -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(from rented-in land equation) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lagged log-Calorie Consumption 0.040 0.04
(0.078) (0.078)
Lagged Adults Body Mass Index 0.002
(0.003)
Observations 7133 7133 7131 7131
17Robust standard errors in parentheses. Village-and-period e¤ects (46 villages, 11 rounds) not shown. ln cit 1
is instrumented by ln cit 2 and all other variables.
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Table 3: Consumption Growth18
Consumption Growth
Linear index
 ln(hh_size)t : 
Residual (ln cit 1)
Linear argument of H(:)
ln cit 1
  ln(hh_size)t 1 : 
ln(hh_size)t
Owned Land
Rainfed Land
Female illness
Male illness
Other income
Information Control
Likelihood
Observations
System Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Round <= 7 Round >= 8
0.248 0.249 0.212 0.267
(0.075) (0.035) (0.60) (0.34)
-0.571 -0.565 -0.652 -0.505
(0.024) (0.024) (0.075) (0.040)
1 1 1 1
(-) (-) (-) (-)
0.248 0.249 0.212 0.267
(-) (-) (-) (-)
-0.466 -0.458 -0.332 -0.435
(0.083) (0.15) (0.46) (0.17)
-0.020 -0.015 -0.032 0.005
(0.006) (0.003) (0.0157) (0.007)
-0.041 -0.052 0.448 -0.173
(0.014) (0.0264) (0.38) (0.30)
-0.231 -0.220 -0.193 -0.203
(0.066) (0.062) (0.41) (0.070)
0.008 0.004 0.013 -0.038
(0.0011) (0.0085) (0.0057) (0.0480)
-0.181 -0.197 -0.311 -0.168
(0.1367) (0.1426) (0.6563) (0.0249)
0.011 0.034 0.007
(0.0016) (0.0166) (0.0031)
-850.0 -829.6 204.8 -809.8
7133 7133 3704 3429
18Quadratic splines. 8 knots. Penalization parameter =1.69. Robust standard errors below estimates in paren-
thesis. Village-and-period e¤ects (46 villages, 11 rounds) not shown. ln cit 1 is instrumented by ln cit 2 and all
other variables. Coe¢ cients whose standard errors are (-) are normalized or set by a structural restriction.
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Figure 1: Quadratic Splines: Optimal Smoothing.
A Appendix to Section 2
Lemma 8 P^ (V ) is di¤erentiable on

V ; V

:
Proof. >From Carathéodorys Theorem (see Rockafellar (1970), corollary 17.1.5), the opti-
mum obtains with a two-point support distribution, say V 2

V 1 ; V
2

	
with probability p and
1   p. Thus an optimal allocation is such that conditional on , the distribution of the future
utility solves the program
P^ (V) = max
p2]0;1]

pP (V 1 ) + (1  p)P (V 2 )
	
s:t: pV 1 + (1  p)V 2 = V:
For conciseness, we now focus on a point at which P (V ) = P^ (V ) so that there is no randomization
and p = 1; and consider the solution of program P . Notice that it must be the case that
8e 2 E ;  (e)  0: Otherwise a reduction in  (e) would raise the utility of agent 2 without
a¤ecting the other constraints. Notice also that given that P is decreasing on

V ; V

; the
agent 1 receives a utility strictly larger than the autarky level for V < V : As a consequence,
the constraint (10) is not binding in at least one state s^, since otherwise the agent 1 could
not receive more than the autarky level. Then, for x small, consider the allocation obtained
by simply adjusting c2 (s^) by (x) such that ps^ (v (c2 (s^) +  (x))  v (c2 (s^))) = x and c1 (s^) to
c1 (s^)   (x) : The new utility of agent 1 is
H(V + x) = P^ (V ) + ps^
 
u
 
c1 (s^)   (x)  u  c1 (s^)  P^ (V + x)
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as the new allocation is feasible and yields V +x to agent 2. Moreover H is concave and di¤eren-
tiable, and H (V ) = P^ (V ) : From lemma 1 in Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979), the function
P^ (:) is di¤erentiable
Lemma 9 Q(:) is strictly concave.
Proof. First notice that for V = 0; the solution is to set  t = 0 and c1t = !t at all dates
so that P^ (0) = P (0) = 1
1 
P
s psu(!
1 (s) + !2 (s)) and no incentive constraint is binding. Given
that v0(0) = +1, we obtain P^ 0(0) = 0 > P^ 0( V ): Consider the set B of slopes b such that
b =  P^ 0(V ) occurs for more than one value V . The solution of Q(V ) is a function V^ () with
P^ 0(V^ ()) = Q0(V ) if  >
Q0(V )
P^ 0( V )
; V^ () = V if   Q
0(V )
P^ 0( V )
:
This denes V^ () uniquely except when Q
0(V )

2 B; which occurs with zero probability since B is
a countable set and  is a continuous random variable. Consider now V 0 > V with a solution
V 0 (). It is impossible that Q0(V 0) = Q0(V ) because this would imply V 0 () = V () with
probability one and thus contradicts E fV 0 ()g = V 0 > V: Thus Q0(:) must be decreasing.
A.1 Proof of proposition 4
We solve the program  () = maxT ^ (; T ) where
^ (; T ) = max
(c1(s);c2(s);V (s))s;
X
s2S
ps
 
u
 
c1 (s)

+ Q (V (s)) + 

v
 
c2 (s)

+ V (s)

s:t (10) ; (11) ; (12) :
Lemma 10 There exists a function  (!; ) with values in [ P^ 0(V ); P^ 0( V )[, decreasing in 
whenever interior, such that the solution satises:
u0 (c1 (s))
v0 (c2 (s))
=  Q0 (V (s)) = min f;  (! (s) ;  (s))g
Proof. Given the separability in  (e), we can optimize events by events: ^ (; T ) =P
e pee (;  (e)) where:
e (;  (e)) = max
(c1(s);c2(s);V (s))
E

u
 
c1 (s)

+ Q (V (s)) j e+ E v  ! (s)  c1 (s)+ V (s) j e
s.t. 
ps
pe
1s

u
 
c1 (s)

+ Q (V (s))  u ( (s)) + v1 8s 2 e (A.1)
ps
pe
s

V (s)  V (A.2)
ps
pe

s

V  V (s) (A.3)
where the terms in parentheses are Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian of the program is:X
s2e
ps
pe

u
 
c1 (s)

+ Q (V (s)) + 

v
 
! (s)  c1 (s)+ V (s)
+1s

u
 
c1 (s)

+ Q (V (s))

+ (
s
  s)V (s)
o
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As the program is strictly concave, the rst order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for
optimality. After elimination of 
s
, s, they reduce to:
u0 (c1 (s))
v0 (c2 (s))
=

1 + 1s
 Q0   V   
1 + 1s
 
= if V (s) < V

v0(c2 (s)) = u0
 
c1 (s)
  
1 + 1s

:
Let (:) be the (increasing) inverse function of  Q0(:) and  1(!; ) be the solutions of
u0
 
 1

v0
 
!    1 = :
The solution coincides with c1 (s) =  1(! (s) ; ) and V (s) = () in all states where the
incentive constraint is not binding:
u
 
 1 (! (s) ; )

+ Q(())  u ( (s)) + v1: (A.4)
The LHS of the condition decreases with : Dene  (!; ) as the solution of equation (A.4)
holding with equality. Then (!; ) decreases with ; and the incentive constraint is not binding
whenever    (! (s) ;  (s)).
Now suppose that    (! (s) ; !1 (s) +  (e)). Then u
0(c1(s))
v0(c2(s)) =  Q0(V (s)) =  (! (s) ;  (s)) =

1+1s
satises the rst order conditions and thus is the solution.
Lemma 11 The mapping T () :  ! argmaxT ^ (; T ) is a monotone non-increasing corre-
spondence in  (according to the strong order set).
Proof. We can restrict attention to the subset  (e)  0 where @'e
@(e)
 0. The result follows
from Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Theorem 4. Given the separability in  (e), ^ (; T ) is quasi-
supermodular in T: The following lemma shows that it also satises the single crossing condition
in (T ;).
Lemma 12 For a.e.  (e), 1

@^(;T )
@(e)
is non-increasing with ; decreasing if (10) is binding in
some state of event e:
Proof. >From the envelope theorem, at any point where Pr f!1 (s) +  (e) = 0 j eg = 0; and
thus for all except a nite number of values of (e), we have
@e(;  (e))
@ (e)
=  E

v0(c2 (s))
@' (e;  (e))
@ (e)
+ 1su
0  !1 (s) +  (e) j e :
Denote by  ^(; !) the solution of
 ^ = u0 (x) = v0(!   x)
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When  > ; then 1s =

(!(s);(s))
  1 and v0(c2 (s)) = 

 ^(; ! (s)): When  < ;then 1s = 0
and v0(c2 (s)) =  ^(; ! (s)):Thus
@e(;  (e))
@ (e)
=  E

 ^(; ! (s))
@' (e;  (e))
@ (e)
j  < ; e

prob( <  j e)
  E



 ^(; ! (s))
@' (e;  (e))
@ (e)
+



  1

u0
 
!1 (s) +  (e)
 j  > ; e prob( >  j e)
This function is di¤erentiable in  for all  such that  is not equal to  with probability 1:
Otherwise the argument which follows applies to the right and left derivative in . We have:

@
@

@e(;  (e))
@ (e)

=  E
(

@ ^(; ! (s))
@
@' (e;  (e))
@ (e)
j  < ; e
)
prob( <  j e)
  E



 ^(; ! (s))
@' (e;  (e))
@ (e)
+


u0
 
!1 (s) +  (e)
 j  > ; e prob( >  j e)

@
@

@e(;  (e))
@ (e)

=
@e(;  (e))
@ (e)
+ E
( 
 ^(; ; ! (s))  @ ^(; ! (s))
@
!
@' (e;  (e))
@ (e)
j  < ; e
)
prob( <  j e)
  E u0  !1 (s) +  (e) j  > ; e	 prob( >  j e)
As
 ^   @ ^
@
= v0

1  u
00
u00 + v00

> 0
and @'e
@(e)
0; we have

@
@

@e(;  (e))
@ (e)

 @e(;  (e))
@ (e)
:
Equality arises only if prob( >  j e) = 1 and  (e) = 0, which means that the incentive
constraints is not binding.
This shows that for a.e.  (e) : @
@

1

@^
@(e)

= @
@

1

pe
@e
@(e)

= pe
2

 @
@

@e
@(e)

  @e
@(e)

 0;
with equality only if the incentive constraint is never binding in event e:
Proof of proposition 4. Condition (19) follows from lemma 11, condition (20) follows
from Lemma (10); and condition (21) follows from Lemma (10) and condition (16). The set of
values where T () is not singled values is countable since T () is increasing with a compact
support. From the argument of lemma 9, the probability that a t belongs to this set is zero.
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B Appendix to Section 3
B.1 Lemma 6
Using equation (25) and the linearity of ln vt by Assumption 3.2(vi), simple algebra delivers the
rst statement:
it =  (1 + 0
@ ln vt
@it
)it 1()  xit(@ ln vt
@xit
+ x0
@ ln vt
@it
) (B.1)
 qit(@ ln vt
@qit
+ q0
@ ln vt
@it
)  zit(z @ ln vt
@it
0) + ~vt + "
0
it(it; it) (B.2)
=  (1 + 0@ ln vt
@it
)(it 1() +mitm + vt) + "
0
it (B.3)
where vt is a linear combination of village-and-period e¤ects and where "
0
it is a linear combination
ofit and it: "
0
it is independent of any covariates wit and is absolutely continuous by Assumption
3.2(iii). As a consequence, the second statement follows:
E(it1fit  0g j wit) = E(it1fit  0g j 0it) = H(0it)
where 0it = it 1() +mitm + vt and function H(x) is positive.
Furthermore (1 + 0
@ ln vt
@it
) > 0 (although @ ln vt
@it
< 0 by Proposition 4 (ii)) because the ratio
of marginal utility tomorrow, it+1(); is an increasing function of marginal utility today, it(),
because of the strict concavity of function Q(:):
Moreover, function H(x) is equal (up to a positive scale) to:
H(x) /
Z
u>x
( x+ u)f(u)du;
and thus:
H 0(x) /  Pr(u > x);
which proves that H(:) is decreasing, convex and twice di¤erentiable. The scale parameter is
given by the coe¢ cient of it 1() in equation (B.2) which proves the third statement of the
Lemma.
Finally, equation (B.1) implies the fourth statement that the coe¢ cients of zit are proportional
to z:
B.2 Proposition 7
The only remaining parameters of interest to identify m and H() are in the consumption equa-
tion. We rst show that Assumptions 3.2 (vii,viii) are normalizations at the village-and-period
level. Then we show how m and H() are identied on the support S
(v;t)
I and thus are globally
identied.
Fix v and t and drop those indices. Write the consumption equation as:
E( j  1;m) =  +H( 1 +mm + ) (B.4)
As function H is positive, decreasing and convex and as its argument u =  1 + mm + 
is bounded, this moment condition is invariant to transformations of (; ;H(u)) into ( +
a0; + a1; a0+H(u  a1)) where (a0; a1) are any pair of scalars such that a0 < minuH(u  a1).
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Hence, (; ;H) is not identied and we can adopt any normalization (a0; a1; H0) for the true
(; ;H). More precisely, we can normalize the location ofH(:) and the location of its argument.
Recall that by Assumption 3.2 (iii & v), the variable  1 is absolutely continuous and ( 1;m)
are bounded so that  1+mm+ a1 is a bounded index which distribution is continuous on the
support SI : The support is connected by Assumption 3.2 (vii). Any quantile normalization such
as the median in Assumption 3.2 (vii) implies that 0 is an interior point of SI . Assumption 3.2
(viii) then posits that, at that value 0, H takes value 0.
We now return to the proof of the Proposition. As function H is bounded, decreasing and
twice di¤erentiable and as the index is continuous on SI , E( j  1;m) necessarily continuously
decreases from cH to cL (say) where cL < cH :
Conversely, for any c 2 [cL; cH ], the set S0 = f( 1;m) such that E( j  1;m) = cg is
dened and equal to a linear manifold  1 + mm = b. Therefore m is identied because of
Assumption 3.2 (v). By Assumption 3.2(vii), a1 =  Median( 1 + mm). Denote S0 the set
of values of ( 1;m), such that  1 + mm + a1 = 0. Then, a0 = E( j ( 1;m) 2 S0) is
identied. For any value b = ( 1+mm+ a1) in support SI , we can then construct function H
as the function of b such as:
H(b) = E( j  1 +mm + a1 = b)  a0
and H is identied in SI .
Finally, as (m; H) are identied at the village-and-period level, they are identied globally,
H() on the union of the previous sets which all contain 0.
C Data Appendix
The data provided by IFPRI consist of a sample of 927 households (rst round) interviewed 12
times between 1986 and 1989. The survey is realized in four districts in three regions (Attock
and Faisalabad in Punjab, Badin in the Sind, and Dir in the North West Frontier Province). In
each of the four districts, villages were randomly chosen from a comprehensive list of villages
classied in three sets according to their distances to two markets (mandis), and, households were
randomly drawn from a comprehensive list of village households. Some attrition is observed in
the data (887 households in the nal survey) that seems to stem from administrative and political
problems rather than from self-selection of households (Alderman and Garcia, 1993). We shall
assume that attrition is exogenous.
In the survey, household demographics are directly available. Household food consumption is
initially reported by food item, in quantity and value, or quantity and price. It comprises meals
at home including home-produced goods, and meals taken outside for all household members
except meals that were the result of invitation or rewards in kind as the information on those
items was not available. The non durable non food expenditures correspond mainly to heating
expenditures. Other expenditures are related to travel, education, entertainment (very few),
health, hygiene, clothes and tobacco, electricity and gas (some of which were missing in the
sample for several periods). Transfers correspond to transfers received from relatives, friends
and from solidarity funds of local mosques (zakat).
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C.1 Tables
Table A.1 : Rented-in land area19
OLS 2SLS
Net rented-in area (1) (2)
ln ct 1 -1.807 -5.323
(0.275) (0.851)
qit : land owned
total land in village -5.192 -5.054
(0.237) (0.249)
rainfed land in village -5.152 -4.875
(0.785) (0.837)
xit: (log) household size 1.318 1.915
(1.241) (1.340)
xit 1: lag (log) household size 1.735 2.523
(1.256) (1.327)
Constant 5.815 19.666
(1.598) (3.754)
Observations 8053 7133
R-squared 0.53
19Robust standard errors in parentheses. All village-and-period e¤ects (46 villages, 11 rounds) not shown. In
the case of 2SLS estimates, ln cit 1 is instrumented by ln cit 2 and all other variables.
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Table A.2: Consumption & Leisure Separability
Dependent Variable Consumption-growth residuals
Explanatory Variables Coe¤. Std. Error
Male labor (days) -0.0009 (0.0010)
Female labor (days) -0.0045 (0.0024)
Observations 7133
R-squared 0.0007
Table A.3: Within-village Correlations of Income and Consumption Growth20
Within-village Within-village Consumption
Income Correlations Growth Correlations
Dependent Variable Cross-product of residuals (i; j) Cross-product of residuals (i; j)
Explanatory Variables Coe¤. Std. Error Coe¤. Std. Error
jxit   xjtj
total land in village -0.140 (0.0035) -0.030 (0.0030)
rainfed land in village -0.061 (0.010) -0.023 (0.0084)
(log) household size -0.19 (0.012) -0.21 (0.0095)
Observations 137561 137561
R-squared 0.024 0.0056
20This is the regression of all cross-products of residuals of the income equation (or consumption growth
equation) within each village and each period on the distance between explanatory variables. No correction for
rst stage estimation. Village-and-period e¤ects are included and not shown.
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